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A PROGRAM FOR EDUCATION IN
CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION
Craig W. Rasmussen, Cynthia E. Irvine, George W. Dinolt,
Timothy E. Levin, Karen L. Burke
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA
Abstract: Large complex systems need to be analyzed prior to operation so that those
depending upon them for the protection of their information have a well-
defined understanding of the measures that have been taken to achieve security
and the residual risk the system owner assumes during its operation.  The U.S.
military calls this analysis and vetting process certification and accreditation.
Today there is a large, unsatisfied need for personnel qualified to conduct
system certifications. An educational program to address those needs is
described.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Computer and network systems process information critical to
enterprise security.  Should these information systems be vulnerable to
security failures or attacks, the consequences could be grave.  Although
individual components may provide security features and assurance of
correct policy enforcement, their encompassing systems and subsystems are
frequently large and complex. How can a system owner assess the suitability
of a system to operate in a particular environment?  Factors that will affect
this determination include the sensitivity and criticality of the information to
be processed; the physical and cyber context in which the system is expected
to operate; the personnel who will administer and use the system; as well as
a wide variety of technical factors that affect security.
The process used to assess networks and systems and to then officially
authorize their use is known as certification and accreditation. As an
example, an avionics system might be the subject of a certification and
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accreditation. Accreditation is a formal declaration by a designated
approving authority that an AIS is approved to operate in a particular
security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards.
In general, accreditation will result in the approval for the system to be
operated with defined physical conditions, interconnections, personnel
security attributes, and system assurances, in combination with procedural
and technical countermeasures to security threats. The accreditation
describes the operational objectives of the system, defines the threats to the
system and the countermeasures taken to mitigate those threats, and the
resulting residual risks. As part of the process it is recognized that a
reassessment of system security is required periodically, so the accreditation
will have a limited lifetime.
Certification supports the accreditation process by providing analysis of
the technical and non-technical aspects of the system. As the system moves
through its lifecycle, the certifier works with component designers and
integrators to ensure that a specified set of security requirements are met.
Certification supports the accreditation process.
System Certification and Accreditation [7] can help to identify and
mitigate risk in a wide variety of systems.  Consequently, the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) has stated that all information systems will be
certified and accredited to operate at an acceptable level of risk.  Given the
sheer numbers of systems in operation, from business systems to weapons
systems, this is a daunting task.
It is clear that a highly skilled cadre of system certifiers is needed, not
only to address the current demands of the government but also to provide
similar support for the complex systems being fielded in the private sector.
Yet, there are relatively few analysts with the background, training and
education that would qualify to senior leadership for system certifications.
To address the gap between requirements and available qualified personnel,
we are establishing an educational program for system certifiers.
Herein, we provide a high-level overview of the certification and
accreditation process using the U.S. DoD certification and accreditation
model as our example. We will then describe the program we are developing
to provide certifiers with the education and experience needed to progress
from a beginner to an intermediate level.
2. CERTIFICATION AND ACCREDITATION
To ensure that all services perform accreditations to some standard level,
the DoD has published an instruction called The DoD Information
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Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Process (DITSCAP)
[2].  This instruction process provides a degree of confidence that all
accredited systems have undergone an equal and adequate level of analysis
and testing.  Realistically, however, the outcome of certification and
accreditation is dependent on the education and experience of the personnel
conducting the exercise.  Qualified personnel are in short supply, and the
need for individuals to provide technology support for Certification and
Accreditation will continue to grow.
The following sections provide a brief summary of the information
system certification and accreditation (C&A) process defined in relevant
instructions and publications [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. We have chosen to focus on
Navy requirements and our overview is intended to illustrate the complexity
of the C&A task, and the fact that the transition from apprentice to
journeyman certifier requires training, formal education, and field
experience.
2.1 Who is Involved?
There are four principal participants in the C&A process:
Program Manager (PM).  According to the DITSCAP, “program
manager” might refer to three distinct roles over the life of a system.  During
system acquisition, the program manager is the individual responsible for
system procurement and development.  During the operation of the system,
the role belongs to the system manager, who is responsible for system
operations.  When the system undergoes a major change, the role belongs to
the maintenance organization’s program manager.
Designated Approving Authority (DAA). It is the DAA who is ultimately
in the position of accepting an inevitable compromise between the desire for
perfect security, the minimum set of security features required by applicable
legal or regulatory constraints, and the needs of the user community to have
a functional system that meets its needs.  It is the DAA who assumes the
risk; only upon accreditation by the DAA does the system become
operational and able to run with "live" data.
System Certifier. Either alone or as a member of a team, the system
certifier provides a comprehensive evaluation of the security features,
limitations, and vulnerabilities of a target information system.  It is the
certifier’s responsibility to document for the DAA the target system’s level
of compliance with security requirements and the level of residual risk
present in putting the system in operation
User Representative. This individual requires that the system in question
achieve a specified level of functionality.
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2.2 Functional Components of Certification &
Accreditation Process
This section provides an overview the functional components of the
Certification and Accreditation process.  By appreciating this process, the
role and contribution of the System Certifier can be understood in context.
Appendix A provides a glossary of terms.
The DITSCAP process is divided into four major phases: Definition,
Certification, Validation, and Post-Accreditation. Table 1 provides a
synopsis of the steps that must be accomplished during each phase. The
DITSCAP process may be iterative and for large, complex systems it is
sometimes necessary to conduct several iterations.
Table 1. Functional Components in the Certification and Accreditation Process
Phase Step Description
Definition
1 Document Mission Need
2 Conduct Registration
3 Perform Negotiation
4 Prepare System Security Authorization Agreement
Certification
5 Support System Development
6 Perform Certification Analysis
Validation
7 Certification Evaluation
8 Develop Recommendation to Designated Approval Authority
Maintenance
9 Compliance Validation
10 Maintenance of System Security Authorization Agreement
2.2.1 Definition
This phase comprises the first four steps discussed in this document:
documentation of mission need, registration, negotiation, and preparation of
the System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA) (this step is often
incorporated into the negotiation step).
Document Mission Need
This preliminary phase occurs whenever development of a new
information system or modification of an existing system is initiated.
Planning the certification begins with acquiring a thorough understanding of
the system to be certified, the functions that the system must fulfill, and the
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mission served by the system.  This planning also requires a comprehensive
understanding of the steps required in all C&A processes.  The certifier
keeps all concerned personnel fully informed even at this early stage in the
process.  Of particular importance are the following:
• Proposed system mission.
• Proposed system functions.
• Proposed system interfaces.
• Category and classification of information to be processed.
• Anticipated system lifecycle.
• Characteristics of system users.
• Operating environment.
System Registration
The registration phase is the beginning of the dialogue among the key
players in the C&A process.  The steps vary, depending on whether the
subject system has been fielded previously or is under development.  The
first step in the registration phase is a review of the materials from either a
new Document Mission Need phase or from previous life cycle iteration.
The final step in the registration phase is the development of a draft (or draft
update) of the System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA).  In either
case, the draft SSAA represents an agreement among the Program Manager,
the DAA, the CA, and the user representative, and describes the goals that
must be achieved in support of certification as well as the strategy by which
those goals are to be met.  The following list describes key steps in the
process.
• Register the system: Inform key participants (DAA, Certifier,
User representative) that the C&A process must be undertaken.
• Prepare mission description and system identification.  In the
case of a new system, this step relies on the documentation
developed in the previous step.  In the case of a system that has
already been in operation, this step relies on the body of
documentation, including the existing SSAA that should
accompany the system throughout its life cycle.
• Describe the system environment and threat description.  The
system environment has both physical and logical components.
For example, a locked cage in a guarded room presents a much
different picture from the standpoint of vulnerability than does a
desktop in a busy office.  Similarly, a stand-alone system
presents a much more difficult target than, for example, a
networked system with an Internet connection.
• Describe the system architecture and C&A boundary.  This
boundary describes precisely which equipment and systems
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within the domain of the DAA are to be subjected to the C&A
process under development.
• Determine the IT security system class and system security
requirements.  The precise C&A tasks from the DITSCAP are
sensitive to this evaluation, in that they must be performed at one
of four certification levels, ranging from Level 1 (basic security
review) to Level 4 (comprehensive analysis).  Minimum security
requirements are mandated by the DoD level, and can be
strengthened (but not weakened) by the constituent military
services.
• Prepare a DITSCAP plan based on the assembled documentation.
Based upon the preceding steps, this step tailors the DITSCAP
tasks to the system under consideration.   For example, execution
details of each of the DITSCAP tasks are dependent upon the IT
security class determined in the previous step.
• Identify organizations and additional resources required for the
C&A process; this step facilitates measurement of the level of
effort that will be required.
• Develop the draft SSAA.  This document constitutes the basis for
the negotiation phase, which follows.
Perform Negotiation
In the negotiation phase all parties have an opportunity to express their
needs and agree on their respective responsibilities.  The Certifier must
exercise skills whose relevance to the C&A process might be surprising.
These include listening skills, written and oral communication skills, and the
power to persuade.  In principle, the idea is not that the key players lock
themselves in a room until they agree on what must be done, in that
compliance with statutory constraints is mandatory.  Instead the principals
agree on strategy, resources, roles, timeline, etc.  In reality, the certifier
might have to, for example, convince a user representative that allowing
users to hold administrative privileges is unacceptable, or persuade a DAA
the level of residual risk claimed by the certifier.  The draft System Security
Authorization Agreement (SSAA) resulting from the registration phase
provides a framework for the negotiations.  The DITSCAP identifies three
key negotiation tasks:
• Review the draft SSAA for accuracy and completeness, updating as
necessary.
• Conduct a review of the certification requirements, modifying the
SSAA as necessary.
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• Approve the final SSAA, which constitutes the blueprint for the
balance of the certification process.  Here “final” is a relative term, in
that the SSAA is under perpetual scrutiny and, as a living document,
is subject to update as required.
Prepare the System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA)
The SSAA encompasses in a single document all essential security-
related information about a system.  The “final” SSAA is the product of the
activities performed in the first three steps, i.e., documentation, registration,
and negotiation.  As a living document, the SSAA is still subject to updates
at every subsequent step prior to accreditation.  The principal components of
the SSAA are:
• Mission Description and System Identification.  Much of this can
come from the mission needs statement.  Of interest are the
system name and identification, the physical and functional
descriptions of the system, and a summary of the system concept
of operations.
• Description of System Operating Environment.  This
encompasses technical and non-technical context in which the
system will be operated, software, and maintenance
environments, as well as a threat description.
• Description of System Architecture.  This comprises hardware,
software, firmware, interfaces, information flow, and
accreditation boundary.
• IT Security System Class. There are four levels of certification
effort specified in the DITSCAP.  Level 1 consists of a basic
review of security features.  Level 2 adds to the Level 1 effort
some minimal analysis.  Level 3 requires detailed analysis, and
Level 4 requires comprehensive analysis.  Determination of
system class is simplified by a checklist-based scoring system
applied to a profile of the target system.  There are overlaps
between adjacent levels, so the Certifier plays a role in ensuring
that the appropriate level of effort is adopted.
• System Security Requirements.  These, including national and
DoD/DoN requirements, data security requirements, security
concept of operations, network connection rules, configuration
and change management requirements, and re-accreditation
requirements.
• Organizations and Resources Required for the C&A Effort.  This
item identifies the principals (PM, DAA, Certifier, User
Representative) and sponsoring organization, enumerates staffing
and funding requirements, certification team training
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requirements, describes roles and responsibilities, and identifies
any additional organizations or groups whose participation is
required.
• The DITSCAP Plan (tailored as necessary).  This includes
tailoring specifics, tasks/milestones, the schedule of work, level
of effort, and specification of roles and responsibilities.
• Appendices containing supporting and/or amplifying
documentation are also prepared.
2.2.2 Certification
This phase comprises the next two steps: support of system development
and certification analysis.
Supporting Systems Development
This is the first step in the Certification Phase of the DITSCAP,
concerned with verification that a system that is in development system
remains compliant with the security specifications of the SSAA.  This
requires more or less continuous oversight on the part of the Certifier as
system development and/or integration progresses. The precise details are
determined by a number of factors, including the certification level specified
in the SSAA and the position of the system in its lifecycle, e.g., new system
development or system maintenance.    Education in the area of computer
and network security is essential in this part of the certification process. The
NSTISSI certifier training document (#4015) identifies the following
performance items associated with this step:
• Coordination with Related Disciplines.  This involves coordination
with various security disciplines for expert assistance.  For example,
it might be necessary to call in experts on physical security, or
emanation security, or cryptography.  The certifier needs to justify to
the DAA the need for such coordination, and to ensure that the
coordinated effort is successfully accomplished.
• Configuration Control.  The certifier must evaluate configuration and
change control with regard to consistency with requirements,
recommending changes and/or reporting deficiencies as necessary.
Included in this step is verification of associated activities, such as
audits, component inventories, etc.
• Information Security Policy.  The certifier must identify all
applicable information systems security policies, keeping the
development team fully informed in order to enable system
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compliance.  The certifier must also monitor development to ensure
compliance.
• Life-Cycle System Security Planning.  The certifier must evaluate the
life-cycle security plan adopted by the development team.  If the plan
is deficient, the certifier must become an active participant in life-
cycle security planning to ensure the desired outcome.
• Principles and Practices of Information Security.  The certifier must
understand the principles and practices of information security and
the way in which those principles apply to the certification effort in
question.  The certifier must also adhere to these principles and, if
necessary, explain these principles to the development team.
• Network Vulnerabilities.  The certifier must perform system analysis
to identify potential network vulnerabilities for the development
team, evaluate the potential impact of such vulnerabilities, and
suggest corrective measures.
Perform Certification Analysis
The certification analysis step determines whether the system in question
is ready to advance to the evaluation and testing that precede a
recommendation to accredit. The DITSCAP specifies the following
component tasks:
• System Architecture Analysis.  This task provides documented
assurance that
• The system architecture is consistent with the architecture
specified in the SSAA.
• Security architecture is consistent with specified security policy
and requirements.
• Interfaces between the subject system and other systems are
identified and evaluated in terms of supporting the required
system security posture.
• Software Design Analysis.  The output of this step documents
that security features required of the Trusted Computing Base
(TCB), such as authentication, access control, and auditing, are
implemented as specified.
• Network Connection Rule Compliance Analysis.  This step
provides assurance that neither the network nor the subject
system will have undesired effects on the other’s security
posture.
• Integrity Analysis of Integrated Products.  The subject system
might integrate software, hardware, and firmware from a number
of sources, e.g. commercial-off-the-shelf, government-off-the-
shelf, specialized, etc. This step provides assurance that:
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• Interaction of integrated components does not result in
degradation of the integrity of individual components.
• The result of this integration is compliant with the specified
system security architecture.
• Application of components must be consistent with their
intended use.
The complexity of this step can be considerable, depending upon the
level of certification required.  For example, it might be necessary to
verify the security features of individual components.
• Life Cycle Management Analysis.  This step provides
documented assurance that the security posture of the system will
be preserved by the implemented change control and
configuration management practices.
Vulnerability Assessment.  This step verifies satisfactory progress in
implementation of the security requirements of the SSAA, by evaluating
vulnerabilities and recommending countermeasures.  Any vulnerability
identified during certification analysis must be analyzed in terms of
susceptibility to (and likelihood of) exploitation, and of the associated threat.
The output of this process is a statement enumerating and evaluating residual
risks and estimating the operational impact of accepting or rejecting them.
Residual risk cannot exceed the level of acceptable risk determined by the
DAA.
2.2.3 Validation Phase
Like the Certification Phase, the Validation Phase also comprises two
steps: certification evaluation and development of the recommendation to the
DAA culminating in accreditation.
Certification Evaluation
The objective of this step is to ensure that the system, configured for
deployment, complies with the security specifications as given in the SSAA.
Certification evaluation is applied to hardware, software, firmware, and
additionally includes site inspection.  Main functional items are listed below
and definitions, where definitions of terms may be found in the glossary:
• Security Test and Evaluation
• Penetration Testing
• TEMPEST and Red-Black verification
• Validation of COMSEC compliance
• System management analysis
• Site accreditation survey
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• Contingency plan evaluation
• Risk-based management review
Develop Recommendation to DAA
In this activity the Certification Authority (i.e., the manger of the
certification process) submits to the Designated Approving Authority a
report detailing all findings from the certification process.  If the process has
been successful, the DAA formally accepts the (positive) recommendation
and the outcome is accreditation.  If change is required, an Interim Approval
to Operate may be granted and, all or part of the certification effort is
revisited.  The following elements are identified:
• Access Control Policies.  Access control policies implemented in the
system to be certified must be explained to the DAA.  Included in
this explanation are descriptions of who makes authorization
decisions and on what basis as well as the effectiveness of the
implementation from the standpoint of the requirements.  The
certifier recommends changes, if necessary.
• Administrative Security Policies and Procedures.  The certifier must
consider not only those policies and procedures required by law, but
also those additional policies and procedures that might be required
by agency instruction or other organizational mechanism.  The
certifier must document to the DAA all applicable policies and
procedures and the degree to which the system is in compliance,
recommending countermeasures as needed to address any
deficiencies.
• Certification.  This is a conditional recommendation, outlining (if
necessary) conditions that must be met before a decision to accredit
is recommended.
• Presentation of Security Test and Evaluation Results.  This might
require translation, depending on the audience; however, the
objective is to communicate the results to management and technical
personnel.
• Identification of Potential Corrective Approaches
• Determination of Residual Risk
2.2.4 Post-Accreditation
Finally, the Post-Accreditation Phase corresponds to ongoing
maintenance of the SSAA.
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Compliance Validation
At intervals specified in the SSAA, the system and its operational
environment are subject to review to verify compliance with the SSAA in
terms of security specifications and concept of operations, and to verify that
the threat assessment described in the SSAA remains accurate.  The
principal functional components are:
• Physical security analysis
• Review of SSAA with an update to the SSAA as needed
• Risk-based management review
• Procedural analysis
Compliance re-verification
2.3 Maintenance of the SSAA
While the SSAA is subjected to continuous review and update during
system development, the maintenance step outlined here occurs post-
accreditation to ensure that the SSAA is not allowed to become stale with
respect to the operational system.  The principal players are the same as they
have been throughout the process.  As the operational system undergoes
incremental change, the certifier evaluates the impact of these changes on
system security features, updating the SSAA, if necessary.  Similarly,
updates to the SSAA must themselves be evaluated in order to determine
whether the Certification process must be repeated.  If so, the process reverts
to the appropriate DITSCAP phase. The certifier ensures that the DAA has
up to date information, and the DAA will determine whether continued
operation of the system is approved.  Key components in this step are:
• Control of Configuration Changes
• Maintenance of Configuration Documents





• Risk-based Management Review
Compliance Re-verification
3. CERTIFIER EDUCATION
A considerable amount of technical and non-technical analysis is required
to support an accreditation.  This process of system certification provides a
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way by which the technical and non-technical aspects of a system’s security
can be assessed from inception through retirement. The factors that must be
addressed include the sensitivity and criticality of data to be processes, the
system’s environment, its users, its location, its applications,
interconnections, configuration, etc. To achieve these objectives, such
activities as security test and evaluation, risk analysis, and a variety of other
analyses and evaluations are conducted. The level of technical expertise
required for individuals involved in certification is high. Even while
focussing on a single security component of the system, the certifier must
keep the larger system context in mind and be able to understand the impact
and side effects of that component on overall system security.  Thus the
certifier cannot address his or her task using a check list, and focus on
individual pieces, while neglecting the whole.
As is the case with many other aspects of computer science and system
development, e.g. construction of operating systems or construction of
physical databases, one does not learn everything in books or in a standard
classroom.  Even laboratory activities can be inadequate unless they are
specifically designed to foster the development of both implicit as well as
explicit knowledge.  In the case of system certifiers, it has been found that a
combination of knowledge and experience are essential for achieving
mastery of the profession.
The U.S. Department of Defense has imposed requirements for the
certification and accreditation of all information systems to ensure that they
are operated at an acceptable level of risk.  Given the sheer numbers of
systems in operation, from business systems to weapons system, this is a
daunting task. The certification and accreditation problem is further
compounded by the lack of experienced certifiers able to conduct the
required fieldwork. While concentrating on a particular detail, less
experienced certifiers may overlook security weaknesses of the system that
would be found by their more seasoned colleagues.
To address this problem, we have developed an educational program for
certifiers.  It is intended to compress the time it takes an apprentice certifier
to achieve the experience and expertise to become a journeyman certifier.
We believe that master certifiers are those individuals who have
considerable experience and have the education, knowledge and fully
internalized skills to assess the security properties of highly complex
systems. In a sense the activities of the certifier parallel those of a systems
integrator.  Just as there is no expectation that a highly experienced systems
integrator can be created through a set of classroom activities, there is no
expectation that a master certifier can be manufactured.
Students in the program will be of two types: short course students and
resident graduate students. Short course students will typically be personnel
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who may already be working in the area of certification and accreditation or
who are moving into this field. The resident students will be active-duty
officers, or civilians employed either by the DoD or by DoD contractors.  In
all likelihood, graduates of the short program will eventually report to
graduates of the resident program.  The short-program students will spend
approximately eight weeks in formal courses over a period of from eighteen
months to two years.  The courses will be of short duration (typically two
weeks) and high intensity, with eight hours devoted to class and laboratory
exercises each day.  The intervening periods between visits to school will be
spent in the field, where students acquire essential experience.  Resident
students will include certifier courses as electives as part of their Computer
Science graduate program.  Depending upon student background, validation
of prerequisites, and other factors, this program can last between 12 and 24
months.  The certifier courses taken by the resident students will differ from
those taken by the short-program students.  The courses taken by the resident
students will be taught in the usual way, meeting four hours per week over
an entire academic quarter.  Course content might also differ somewhat in
reflection of the different educational and career paths taken by the two
populations of students.
A prerequisite for all resident students is an undergraduate degree in
computer science or a closely related engineering field.






Provides a comprehensive overview of the terminology, concepts,
issues, policies, and technologies associated with the field of
Information Assurance. It covers the notions of threats,
vulnerabilities, risks and safeguards as they pertain to the desired
information security properties of confidentiality, integrity,
authenticity and availability for all information that is processed,





Provides students with a security manager’s view of the diverse
management concerns associated with administering and operating
an automated information system facility with minimized risk.
Students will examine both the technical and non-technical security
issues associated with managing a computer facility, with emphasis
on DoD systems and policies. Students will earn CNSS (formerly




This course is designed to give the student exposure to Internet
security threats in a lab environment. Lectures and labs provide the
student with a "hands on" experience with current network attacks
and vulnerabilities. Foot-printing, scanning, enumeration and
escalation are addressed from an attack prospective. Emphasis on
detection and protection of critical data and nodes is addressed. A
final project that demonstrates skills and knowledge is required.
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Title Catalog Description




This course provides an introduction to the Certification and
Accreditation (C&A) process as applied to procurement and
lifecycle management of DoD and Federal information systems.
Topics include: principal roles, functional components, and output
documents of the C&A process; and a comparison of the
government C&A process specification currently in use
(DITSCAP/NIACAP, FIPS, DCID 6/3) with the emerging effort to
produce a unified specification.
System Certification
Case Studies
This course is part two of the two-course (CS4680 and CS4685)
Certification and Accreditation course sequence. Students will
investigate 2-3 case studies of systems that have been evaluated,
and then apply the lessons of CS4680 to make final accreditation
decisions. Successful completion of this two-course sequence leads
to NSTISSI DAA and Certifier certification.
Our educational program is based on courses already in use as well as
two new courses specific to the Certification and Accreditation Process. The
courses are briefly described in Table 2. The first three courses are intended
to provide students with an understanding of the problem domain for system
certification. Introduction to Information Assurance is a survey course and
provides students with a broad overview of the many aspects of the
certification domain. The second course, Secure Management of Systems,
leads to and understanding of the administrative, procedural, and personnel
issues that might affect the ongoing security of a system. Finally, Network
Security Threat Analysis provides students with an appreciation of the
techniques and skills that will be brought to bear by adversaries attacking
their systems. When combined with their background in computer science
the three-course sequence described above prepares students for the two
courses specific to certification.
Introduction to Certification and Accreditation is intended to teach
students about all aspects of the certification and accreditation process.
They are introduced to procedural aspects of the process as well as to the
variety of technical issues that might be addressed.  A considerable amount
of social skill and team building is required for a successful certification, and
students learn about the give-and-take required to achieve success. Students
must understand when certain security requirements must be adhered to at all
cost and when some flexibility may be appropriate.1
1 Long ago, a flag-level officer complained to one of the authors about the inability of a
command to deploy a system because, from his perspective, the certifier appeared to be
unusually inflexible regarding a particular point. A certifier’s communications and
interpersonal skills might prevent possible misunderstandings and resulting frustration.
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The capstone course in the sequence centers on a group of case studies.
These are taken from real systems and allow students to understand how a
certifier can help ensure that the security requirements are met. The cases
include not only technical and procedural aspects of the certification, but
discussion of the social process required to accomplish the certification.
An unusual aspect of the program is its mentoring process. Students in
the program will have the opportunity to interact with instructors and staff
who have experience in DITSCAP certification. This mentoring experience
will help speed their mastery of the certification process. A member of our
educational team with significant experience in certification keeps in touch
with short course students while they are in the field gaining on-the-job
experience. Students can communicate and commiserate with each other
about their challenges and experiences. Because the certifier community is
relatively small, it is expected that students will get to know senior certifiers
and be able to ask them questions as they progress.
Program assessment will be a feedback mechanism that should benefit
from the involvement of the sponsoring organization.  It is one of the
principal Navy commands involved in certification and accreditation of IT
systems and components.   Student assessment will be to some extent
program-dependent.  The performance of resident students will be assessed
in the usual ways, by examination scores, performance on laboratory
exercises, quality of written work, etc.  The performance of the nonresident
students will be based not only on their classroom and laboratory
performance while here at NPS but also on their performance on the job
between visits to NPS.  Both populations will be assessed on their abilities to
apply the regulatory framework (e.g., DITSCAP) to systems that vary widely
in their makeup.  Students in both populations will benefit from success
factors that are built into the program.  For example, the students will arrive
on board with appropriate backgrounds, the material covered will be chosen
with the assistance of experienced professionals from the field, and case
studies will include both system-level and component-level case studies.
Two surveys will be used for requesting feedback from the nonresident
graduates and their “on-the-job” mentors. When the nonresident students
graduate from the course, they will go to certification organizations as
certifiers.  In most certification organizations, the new certifiers are teamed
with experienced certifiers for their initial certifications. These experienced
certifiers act as their mentors.  Generally these initial certifications are on the
less complex systems that require a lower level of certification. As the new
certifiers gains experience, they undertake increasingly more complex or
secure systems. These progressions occur with the approval of the
experienced certifier/mentor, until eventually the certifier is considered
experienced enough to certify alone.
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The senior mentors will be asked to complete a survey, giving us
feedback on whether or not the mentor feels the certifier had enough
classroom training and what areas need to be modified or added.  The school
will ask the new certifiers to evaluate how well the certifiers’ course
prepared them for their certification experiences. Again, we would welcome
suggestions for improvement. Also, the school will maintain a continuing
relationship with its graduates, offering them continued mentoring. Not only
will this feedback loop assist the school in assessing the certifiers’ course, it
will assist us in ensuring that the course material reflects current systems.
4. SUMMARY
Large complex systems should be analyzed prior to operation so that
those depending upon them for the protection of their information will have
a well-defined understanding of the measures that have been taken to
achieve security and the residual risk the system owner assumes during its
operation.  The U.S. military calls this analysis and vetting process
certification and accreditation. Today there is a large, unsatisfied need for
personnel qualified to conduct system certifications. We have described an
educational program designed to address those needs.
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY
Accreditation: Accreditation is the statement granting approval to
operate to a particular information system, with specified security safeguards
and at a level of residual risk deemed acceptable.  Accreditation is issued by
the DAA in the form of the System Security Authorization Agreement
(SSAA).
Certification:  Certification is the process of evaluating the security
features of a given system and the assurance levels achieved.  Certification
also refers to the documentation that results, specifying the extent to which
the system complies with identified security requirements and the level of
residual risk inherent in placing the system in operation at that level of
compliance.
Certification Authority (CA): The individual with responsibility for
managing the certification process.  The CA determines whether the
complexity of a system requires that the System Certifier be an individual or
a team, by identifying the types of expertise required for the certification.
Communications Security (COMSEC):  The steps taken to ensure
security and integrity of information during telecommunications, especially
encryption, electromagnetic emissions security, and physical security steps.
Designated Approving Authority (DAA): The DAA is the individual,
typically a senior officer, who ultimately accepts the risk inherent in making
a system operational.  The decision is based on the evaluation of residual
risk provided by the Certification Authority, Information System Security
Manager, or equivalent.  This evaluation is in turn likely to be assisted by the
Certification Agent, or ISSO, and the Program Manager.  The DoN uses the
term DAA to describe two distinct roles.  First is the Developmental DAA,
who is in the DAA seat during program development.  The Developmental
DAA issues a type accreditation statement for the system in question prior to
deployment.  At the time of deployment, control passes to the Operational
DAA, who is ultimately responsible for the risk incurred at system startup.
The type accreditation statement generated during development is part of the
system documentation and is thus available to the Operational DAA.
D I T S C A P :  The DoD Information Security Certification and
Accreditation Process established by DoD Instruction 5200.40.  The process
formalized by the DITSCAP is fundamentally identical to the process
described in this document, although there are superficial differences.  The
DITSCAP breaks the C&A process into four phases.  Phase 1 (Definition)
comprises the first four steps discussed in this document: documentation of
mission need, registration, and negotiation, and final preparation of the
SSAA (this step is incorporated into the negotiation step).  Phase 2
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(Verification) comprises the next two steps: support of system development
and certification analysis.  Phase 3 (Validation) also comprises two steps:
certification evaluation and development of the recommendation to the DAA
culminating in accreditation.  Phase 4 (Post-Accreditation) corresponds to
the final step in this document, which is maintenance of the SSAA.  The
DITSCAP was designed to be a flexible standard, readily tailored to support
C&A efforts on a variety of systems including program-of-record, legacy,
site, installed program-of-record, and locally-obtained systems.
Information System Security Manager (ISSM): The ISSM advises the
DAA on Information Assurance issues.
Information System Security Officer (ISSO): The individual
responsible for ensuring that the security safeguards of a system are
maintained as specified in the accreditation, throughout the system lifecycle.
Interim Approval to Operate (IATO): An IATO can be issued for a
number of reasons. For example, it might be that (a) ST&E has not been
completed in the operational setting, thereby preventing completion of the
C&A process, or (b) the DAA is unwilling to accept the identified level of
risk except on a provisional basis.
Program Manager (PM):  The individual responsible for system
procurement and development, operations, or maintenance, depending upon
life cycle stage.
Residual Risk:  Amount of risk remaining after security measures have
been applied.
Risk:  A combination of the likelihood that a threat will occur, the
likelihood that a threat occurrence will result in an adverse impact, and the
severity of the resulting impact.
Software Support Activity, System Support Activity (SSA):
Individual or organization responsible for life cycle support.
Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E): Testing and evaluation of the
security features of a system as applied in an operational setting, to
determine compliance with the specifications in the final SSAA.
System Certifier: An individual or member of a team, responsible for
conducting a comprehensive analysis of the security features in a given
system, and for evaluating the risks inherent in operating the system in
question.
System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA): The SSAA
represents an agreement among the principals (PM, DAA, CA, User
Representative), and documents the DITSCAP process.  The final SSAA
documents acceptance by the DAA of the level of risk inherent in making the
system operational.
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TEMPEST: The DITSCAP describes TEMPEST as the “short name
referring to investigation, study, and control of compromising emanation
from IS equipment.
Threat: Any circumstance or event with the potential to harm an IS
through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data,
and/or denial of service
Trusted Computing Base (TCB): The TCB is the suite of security
features interacting within a given information system to enforce a specified
security posture.
